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MAYA v. CENTEX: POTENTIAL 
LIABILITIES FOR DEVELOPERS 




Prior to the sub-prime mortgage crisis from 2007 to 2010,1 many 
lenders approved substantial mortgages to prospective homebuyers who 
lacked adequate financing.2  Various market factors encouraged lenders 
and prospective homeowners to engage in the housing market, including 
“[f]avorable tax laws, high-leverage loan creativity, baby boomers 
             * J.D. Candidate, May 2013, Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco, 
California; B.A. 2009, Criminal Justice, San Francisco State University, San Francisco, California.  I 
would like to thank the Golden Gate University Law Review Editorial Board, particularly Kate 
Baldridge, Alexandra Vesalga, and Professor Ed Baskauskas, without whose guidance this paper 
would not have been published.  I am especially grateful to have the support of the law librarian 
faculty advisors, Professor Michael Daw and Professor Jennifer Pesetksy.  I would also like to thank 
Professor Stefano Moscato who provided exceptional advice in shaping this article.  Finally, I 
dedicate this article in memory of my beloved late aunt and mother figure, Lillian Lee, for her 
boundless, unconditional love and support.   
             1 MICHAEL T. MADISON, JEFFRY R. DWYER & STEVEN W. BENDER, THE LAW OF REAL 
ESTATE FINANCING § 3:5 (rev. ed. 2012), available at Westlaw REFINLAW § 3:5 (stating that the 
real estate decline from 2007 to 2010 was similar to the balance-sheet recession in the early 1990s); 
Justin Pritchard, Mortgage Crisis Overview: What Caused the Mortgage Crisis?, ABOUT.COM 
Banking/Loans, banking.about.com/od/mortgages/a/mortgagecrisis.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) 
(stating that the mortgage crisis that reached the U.S. economy in 2007 was due to multiple factors, 
including greed, fraud, and excessive borrowing). 
 2 Broderick Perkins, Housing Market Was 2006’s Top Business Story, REALTY TIMES (Jan. 
3, 2007), realtytimes.com/rtpages/20070103_topstory.htm (“At the housing market’s peak, buyers 
rushed to open houses, blank checks in hand.  Lenders gave big-money mortgages to people who 
could barely afford their monthly payments.” (quoting AP’s Ellen Simon)). 
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buying second[] [houses] and day traders who became housing market 
speculators.”3  In 2007, however, the commercial and residential real 
estate market rapidly declined, while lenders reduced the availability of 
credit.4  With limited access to credit, buyers financially incapable of 
supporting their mortgages defaulted, resulting in “foreclosures 
reach[ing] historic proportions in some demographic segments.”5 
Sub-prime mortgage loans contributed significantly to the collapse 
of the real estate market.6  A traditional, prime loan ordinarily consists of 
a thirty-year fixed-rate mortgage for eighty percent of the purchase price, 
requiring a down payment of twenty percent.7  Lenders, however, 
frequently approved sub-prime loans requiring very little or no down 
payment.8  Often, these loans were offered with little regard as to 
borrowers’ financial ability to repay the loans.9 
Homeowners with sub-prime mortgages are more likely to be 
unable to make mortgage payments because they lacked adequate 
financial means at the time of the loan, and likely still do not have the 
means.10  A homeowner who is unable to pay the mortgage, refinance the 
loan, or sell the house might resort to desertion.11  Voluntarily 
 3 Id. 
 4 MADISON ET AL., supra note 1, § 3.5 ( “[I]n 2007 the commercial and multi-family real 
estate markets declined amid both a severe credit crunch and a steep recession in both the Unite[d] 
States and in the global economy.”). 
 5 Perkins, supra note 2; MADISON ET AL., supra note 1, § 3.5 (“The Federal Reserve Board’s 
flow of funds report issued on March 20, 2008 indicate[d] that home equity declined to a record low 
of 47.9% in the fourth quarter of 2007, the first time that homeowner debt on their homes exceeded 
their equity since the Board started to track home equity data in 1945.”). 
 6 Stephanie Armour, Foreclosures Skyrocket 65% in April, USA TODAY (May 14, 2008), 
www.usatoday.com/money/economy/housing/2008-05-14-foreclosures-mortgage-apps_N.htm 
(“Those hardest hit by the tsunami of foreclosures included Arizona, California, Florida and 
Nevada—states where runaway subprime lending and escalating home prices symbolized the real 
estate boom that fizzled in 2006.”). 
 7 Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Contracts, 
94 CORNELL L. REV. 1073, 1096 (2009). 
 8 Les Christie, Homeowners: Can’t Pay? Just Walk Away, CNNMONEY.COM (Feb. 7, 2008), 
money.cnn.com/2008/02/06/real_estate/walking_away/index.htm (stating that most buyers’ down 
payments were little to nothing, giving little incentive to continue bad investments). 
 9 Ann M. Burkhart, Real Estate Practice in the Twenty-first Century, 72 MO. L. REV. 1031, 
1045-46 (2007) (lenders made close to forty-five percent of the subprime loans with little or no 
documentation of the borrower’s income). 
 10 WILLIAM C. APGAR, THE MUNICIPAL COST OF FORECLOSURES: A CHICAGO CASE STUDY 
2 (2005), available at www.nw.org/network/neighborworksProgs/foreclosuresolutions/pdf_docs 
/2005Apgar-Dudastudy-FullVersion.pdf (stating that the poor credit of borrowers of nonprime loans 
was an obvious factor, among others, as to why the foreclosure rate of nonprime loans can exceed 
the foreclosure rate of prime loans by ten times). 
 11 Alan Mallach, Abandoned Property: Effective Strategies To Reclaim Community Assets, 
Housing Facts & Findings, May 10, 2004, at 5-6, available at 
www.knowledgeplex.org/cache/documents/30370.pdf (stating that homeowners and heirs abandon 
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abandoning a home financed by a sub-prime loan may be an 
economically rational decision for a borrower who contributed little to no 
down payment, because he or she has little incentive to repay the loan.12  
Homeowners who walked away from bad deals may have cut their 
personal losses, but damages from foreclosed and abandoned properties 
do not stop with the deserter.13 
Foreclosed and vacant properties can cause dire consequences in 
their communities.14  Foreclosed and deserted homes often become a 
breeding ground for various criminal activities.15  These non-pecuniary, 
quality-of-life issues are often of great concern to families and 
prospective homebuyers, and can lead to decreased desirability of the 
properties surrounding foreclosed and abandoned homes, ultimately 
decreasing the surrounding properties’ value.16 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Maya v. Centex addresses the 
impacts of the sub-prime mortgage crisis on fiscally responsible 
homeowners.17  Maya is the first appellate decision to potentially permit 
homeowners to assert claims against developers for injuries related to 
market-wide decline in property values.18  In Maya, the Ninth Circuit 
decided only the narrow question of whether plaintiff-homeowners have 
constitutional standing to pursue claims against defendant-developers for 
injuries that were allegedly caused by the defendants’ high-risk 
their properties when they believe that the properties cannot be sold in the marketplace due to its 
locality or a certain condition of it). 
 12 Christie, supra note 8 (stating that a homeowner who abandons a home that was financed 
by a subprime loan may be better off economically than trying to continue making mortgage 
payments.  For example, “[s]omeone with good credit and a $600,000 home in a town with cratering 
real estate prices could buy a similar house nearby for $450,000, and then let the other $600,000 
mortgage go into foreclosure” because “[c]redit scores are hurt much more by missing multiple 
payments . . . than by a single foreclosure.”). 
 13 Mallach, supra note 11, at 5-6 (“The presence of abandoned property decreases a 
community’s property values, discourages investment by existing residents and potential developers, 
and may encourage further abandonment.”). 
 14 Id. (“A Philadelphia study found that the presence of one abandoned property on a block 
reduced the value of the other properties on the block by nearly $6,500 each.”). 
 15 Id. at 6 (stating that vacant properties often become a venue for various criminal activities, 
“including prostitution and drug trafficking”); APGAR, supra note 10, at 10 (stating that police 
officers observe at abandoned properties a wide range of criminal conduct, “including gang activity, 
drug dealing, prostitution, arson, rape, and even murder”). 
 16 Mallach, supra note 11, at 3, 5-6; see also id. at 7 (quoting Mayor John F. Street). 
 17 Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1065 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 18 Subdivision Homeowners Have Standing To Sue Developer Claiming Its Marketing of 
Homes to Unqualified Applicants Led to Inordinate Foreclosures and Drop in Property Values, 
CAL. TORT. REP., Oct. 2011, available at Westlaw 32 No. 9 CAL. TORT REP. 3; Dan Schechter, 
Developers and Lenders May Be Liable for Artificially Creating Demand Within New Housing 
Tract, Thus Causing Buyers To Overpay, COMM. FIN. NEWS, Sept. 26, 2011, available at Westlaw 
2011 COMM. FIN. NEWS 78. 
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marketing and financing behaviors.19  Although the Ninth Circuit did not 
resolve the plaintiffs’ claims, it held that the plaintiffs have constitutional 
standing to assert their claims against the defendants.20  In doing so, the 
Ninth Circuit may have extended liability to developers for speculative 
injuries that may not be fairly traceable to the developers’ challenged 
conduct. 
I. MAYA V. CENTEX: GREED AND FRAUD, THE “BUYING FRENZY” 
LAWSUIT 
A. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In Maya v. Centex, plaintiffs Sylvester Maya and Ofer Masachi 
brought a putative class action on behalf of themselves and other 
similarly situated homeowners.21  Both plaintiffs had purchased 
residential realty from Centex Homes in November 2005 in San 
Bernardino County, California.22  Defendants Centex Corporation, 
Centex Homes, and CTX Mortgage Company,23 together, were one of 
the biggest housing developers in the nation.24 
Plaintiffs alleged that defendants created a “buying frenzy” that 
raised housing demand and prices through the misrepresentation and 
omission of material facts related to the defendants’ challenged 
conduct.25  Plaintiffs argued that defendants’ alleged high-risk marketing 
and financing behavior were material to their home-buying decisions 
because the risk of numerous foreclosures in the plaintiffs’ communities 
could severely decrease the value and desirability of the community and 
the properties within.26 
In order to attract prospective homeowners to purchase homes, 
defendants allegedly devised a marketing scheme to raise housing profits 
and demand through misrepresenting the new developments as a 
community of stable families.27  In furtherance of their marketing 
scheme, defendants assisted and facilitated home purchases within 
 19 Maya, 658 F.3d at 1065. 
 20 Id. at 1073. 
 21 Maya v. Centex Corp., No. EDCV 09-01671 VAP (OPx), 2010 WL 6843322, at *1 (C.D. 
Cal. Mar. 31, 2010), rev’d, 658 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Maya, 658 F.3d at 1065. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. at 1065-66. 
 27 Maya, 2010 WL 6843322, at *1. 
4
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 9
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol43/iss1/9
2013] MAYA v. CENTEX 151 
 
plaintiffs’ particular neighborhood to unqualified buyers who were 
highly susceptible to the risk of foreclosure.28  Defendants’ financing 
subsidiaries financed the unqualified buyers’ mortgages.29  Further, 
defendants sold homes to speculators and investors who had no intention 
of actually residing within the community.30  Plaintiffs claimed that 
defendants “concealed and intentionally failed to disclose” these facts to 
the plaintiff-homebuyers.31 
Plaintiffs alleged five claims, including fraud, negligent 
misrepresentation, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing.32  Additionally, plaintiffs claimed violation of California’s 
Unfair Business Practices Act and false advertising law.33  Plaintiffs 
sought compensatory damages and the right to rescind their home 
purchases, in addition to attorney’s fees and costs.34 
The defendants made similar arguments in their respective motions 
to dismiss.35  First, they argued that the plaintiffs had neither 
constitutional nor statutory standing to invoke federal jurisdiction.36  
Second, they argued that the plaintiffs’ allegations failed to meet the 
pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) because 
plaintiffs failed to plead with particularity the circumstances to support 
their fraud-based claims.37  Third, the defendants argued that the 
plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which the court may grant relief 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).38 
The United States District Court for the Central District of 
California dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims for lack of constitutional 
standing, finding that the plaintiffs failed to meet two requirements for 
standing: injury-in-fact and causation.39  Specifically, the district court 
 28 Id. at *1-2. 
 29 Maya, 658 F.3d at 1065 (Plaintiffs “allege[d] that defendants financed at least [sixty-five 
percent] of the mortgages on homes in their communities”). 
 30 Maya, 2010 WL 6843322, at *1-2. 
 31 Id. at *2. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id.; see CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200, 17500 (Westlaw 2013). 
 34 Maya, 658 F.3d at 1065; see also First Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 61-78, Maya, 2010 WL 
6843322 (No. 509CV01671), 2009 WL 5439289. 
 35 Maya, 2010 WL 6843322, at *2; Maya, 658 F.3d at 1066. 
 36 Maya, 2010 WL 6843322, at *2; Maya, 658 F.3d at 1066. 
 37 Maya, 2010 WL 6843322, at *2; Maya, 658 F.3d at 1066; see FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) 
(requiring that the pleading party allege with particularity the circumstances warranting a claim for 
fraud). 
 38 Maya, 2010 WL 6843322, at *2; Maya, 658 F.3d at 1066; see FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 39 Maya, 658 F.3d at 1066 (noting that the district court relied on three cases with similar 
facts and held that plaintiffs failed to allege a sufficient injury in fact for constitutional standing 
(citing Kaing v. Pulte Homes, Inc., No. 09-5057 SC, 2010 WL 625365 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2010); 
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found that the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries were not actual injuries-in-fact40 
and that causation between the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries and the 
defendants’ challenged conduct of high-risk marketing and financing 
behavior was not established.41  Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s 
decision to the Ninth Circuit after their request for leave to amend was 
denied.42 
B. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION 
The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the district court and clarified the 
proper standard of review for constitutional standing, distinguishing it 
from the analysis required for statutory standing.43  The Ninth Circuit 
held that plaintiffs had constitutional standing to pursue their claims 
against defendants, but in holding so, the court addressed only the first 
two elements of constitutional standing, because all parties 
acknowledged that a favorable ruling would redress the plaintiffs’ 
alleged injuries.44 
The Ninth Circuit categorized plaintiffs’ claimed damages into two 
broad categories: at-time-of-sale injuries and after-sale injuries.45  
Plaintiffs’ overpayment and rescission claims were considered injuries 
that occurred at the time of the sale.46  The Ninth Circuit recognized 
plaintiffs’ overpayment and rescission claims as actual and concrete 
economic injuries that occurred at the time of purchase.47  The Ninth 
Circuit further found that plaintiffs had established causation for their 
overpayment and rescission claims, because defendants were able to 
influence the terms of many buyers’ loans in plaintiffs’ particular 
communities to “create demands that would not otherwise have 
existed.”48 
Plaintiffs’ claims for decreased property value and desirability were 
considered injuries that occurred after the sale.49  The Ninth Circuit 
Tingley v. Beazer Homes Corp., No. 3:07cv176, 2008 WL 1902108 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 25, 2008); 
Green v. Beazer Homes Corp., No. 3:07-1098-CMC, 2007 WL 2688612, (D.S.C. Sept. 10, 2007))). 
 40 Maya, 2010 WL 6843322, at *5. 
 41 Id. at *11; Maya, 658 F.3d at 1066. 
 42 Maya, 658 F.3d 1060. 
 43 See id. at 1067. 
 44 Id. at 1069. 
 45 Id. at 1066. 
 46 Id. (noting that plaintiffs allegedly would not have purchased overvalued properties had 
defendants disclosed facts that were material to evaluating the properties’ true value). 
 47 Id. at 1069 (stating that the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have recognized clear and 
obvious economic injuries as a sufficient basis for standing). 
 48 Id. at 1070. 
 49 Id. at 1066. 
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recognized plaintiffs’ decreased value and desirability claims as 
cognizable injuries for constitutional standing purposes.50  The Ninth 
Circuit, however, held that plaintiffs did not establish sufficient causation 
for constitutional standing because any loss related to such claims could 
be ascribed to other, third-party actors not involved in the lawsuit.51  But 
the court did permit plaintiffs to amend their complaints and to provide 
expert testimony to show causation between defendants’ alleged 
misconduct and plaintiffs’ decreased property value and desirability 
claims.52  Further, the court noted that expert testimony could be used to 
distinguish the causal link from other possible independent third parties 
who may have contributed to plaintiffs’ alleged losses.53 
II.     THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S STANDING ANALYSIS 
A. CONSTITUTIONAL STANDING 
Constitutional standing—the constitutional limitation on the federal 
judiciary to hear only those cases or controversies over which it has 
federal subject matter jurisdiction54—is the deciding factor in “whether 
[a plaintiff] is entitled to have the [federal] court [to] decide the merits 
of” a plaintiff’s claims.55  A plaintiff who seeks the jurisdiction of the 
federal court system must satisfy three requirements to establish that he 
or she has constitutional standing: injury-in-fact, causation, and 
redressability.56 
A plaintiff must prove that he or she suffered an “injury in fact” that 
involves the intrusion of a legally protected right.57  Two components 
 50 Id. at 1070-71. 
 51 Id. at 1072 (“We agree with the district court that plaintiffs have not established how 
defendants’ actions necessarily result in foreclosure, nor do plaintiffs’ complaints allege that the 
decreased value is caused by the risk posed by their neighbors (even absent foreclosures).” (footnote 
omitted)); Maya v. Centex Corp., No. EDCV 09-01671 VAP (OPx), 2010 WL 6843322, at *9 (C.D. 
Cal. Mar. 31, 2010), rev’d, 658 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 52 Maya, 658 F.3d at 1072-73 (citing Barnum Timber Co. v. EPA, 633 F.3d 894, 900-01 (9th 
Cir. 2011)). 
 53 Id. 
 54 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Jasmine Networks, Inc. v. Superior Court, 180 Cal. App. 
4th 980, 990 (6th Dist. 2009). 
 55 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-51 (1984) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 
(1975)). 
 56 Maya, 658 F.3d at 1067 (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc., v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), 
Inc, 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 
(1992))). 
 57 Id. (citing Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180-81). 
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determine whether a plaintiff has suffered an injury-in-fact.58  First, a 
plaintiff’s injury must be “concrete and particularized.”59  Second, 
plaintiff must have suffered actual losses, damages, or injury, or be able 
to show that such a loss is likely to occur,60 and the injury must not be 
speculative.61  Economic injuries can satisfy this requirement.62  The 
purpose of these two components is to gauge whether the injury is too 
abstract to be judicially cognizable.63 
The injury-in-fact requirement may also encompass alleged injuries 
that are dependent on future events.64  Although standing is not 
established when the alleged injury depends on the occurrence of 
“contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed 
may not occur at all,”65 a contingent liability—one whose occurrence is 
dependent on the outcome of a future event—may constitute an injury-
in-fact if it encompasses actual and imminent consequences.66 
Second, the party who invokes federal jurisdiction must establish a 
causal connection between the alleged injury-in-fact and the defendant’s 
challenged conduct.67  That is, plaintiff’s claimed injury must be “fairly 
traceable” to the defendant’s particular acts or omissions.68  A causal 
chain that involves numerous links does not necessarily render the causal 
relationship too tenuous if those links are not speculative.69 
 58 Id. (citing Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180-81 (plaintiff must have suffered an 
“‘injury in fact’ that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or 
hypothetical”)). 
 59 Id. 
 60 Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979) (plaintiff must show that 
he or she has suffered an actual loss, damage or injury, or is threatened with impairment of his or her 
own interests). 
 61 Maya, 658 F.3d at 1069. 
 62 Id. (noting that the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have recognized clear and 
obvious economic injuries as a sufficient basis for standing). 
 63 7 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law § 76 (10th ed. 2005). 
 64 See, e.g., Clinton v. City of N.Y., 524 U.S. 417, 431 (1998) (“[A] substantial contingent 
liability immediately and directly affects the borrowing power, financial strength, and fiscal planning 
of the potential obligor.”). 
 65 See Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580-81, (1985) (dealing with 
ripeness doctrine, but standard is presumably the same)). 
 66 Clinton, 524 U.S. at 431. 
 67 Maya, 658 F.3d at 1070 (“To survive a motion to dismiss for lack of constitutional 
standing, plaintiffs must establish a ‘line of causation’ between defendants’ action and their alleged 
harm that is more than ‘attenuated.’” (footnote omitted) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 757 
(1984))). 
 68 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60 (1992); Allen, 468 U.S. at 757. 
 69 Maya, 658 F.3d at 1070 (“A causal chain does not fail simply because it has several 
‘links,’ provided those links are ‘not hypothetical or tenuous’ and remain ‘[plausible].’”). 
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Finally, constitutional standing requires that the plaintiff establish a 
substantial likelihood that the relief sought will redress the alleged 
injury.70  It is not enough that a favorable judgment will punish the 
defendant or simply give plaintiff satisfaction; a decision in favor of the 
plaintiff must likely, rather than conjecturally, redress the plaintiff’s 
injury-in-fact.71 
B. STATUTORY STANDING 
For statutory standing under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6), the analysis is mainly restricted to the content of a plaintiff’s 
complaint under the standards of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal.72  Under Twombly, a plaintiff must plead factual 
allegations that are strong enough to support a plaintiff’s right to relief, 
and the pleadings must be “plausible on [their] face”—a standard that is 
higher than mere speculation.73  Under Iqbal, plausibility requires the 
factual content of a plaintiff’s pleadings to be such that the court may 
reasonably infer that the defendant is likely liable for the particular 
challenged act or omission.74 
Taken together, Twombly and Iqbal address the merits of a claim, or 
its legality, to measure whether a plaintiff has stated a claim upon which 
the court can grant relief.75  With Twombly and Iqbal, the Court 
developed two-prong approach to address how a plaintiff’s pleading may 
survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.76  First, the 
reviewing court need not credit mere legal conclusions.77  Second, the 
 70 Id. at 1067. 
 71 See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 107 (1998) (psychic 
satisfaction is not enough for Art III standing). 
 72 Maya, 658 F.3d at 1067-68. 
 73 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (stating that a plaintiff must only 
plead enough facts to support a claim for relief that is “plausible on its face,” effectively requiring 
that claim be more than merely conceivable). 
 74 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“A claim has facial plausibility when the 
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”). 
 75 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (“In keeping with these principles [of Twombly] a court considering 
a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than 
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.  While legal conclusions can provide the 
framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.  When there are well-
pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they 
plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”). 
 76 Maya, 658 F.3d at 1067-68. 
 77 Id. at 1067. 
9
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reviewing court must examine the factual allegations to determine if they 
state a plausible claim for relief.78 
C. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S CLARIFICATION OF THE STANDARD OF 
REVIEW FOR CONSTITUTIONAL STANDING 
The Ninth Circuit held that the district court inappropriately 
dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims for lack of constitutional standing under 
Rule 12(b)(6)—failure to state a claim upon which the court may grant 
relief.79  If a plaintiff does not meet the requirements for constitutional 
standing, the court “lack[s] [the] power to entertain the proceeding“ and 
must dismiss the action under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.80  The absence of statutory standing, rather than 
constitutional standing, requires a court to dismiss a plaintiff’s claim 
under Rule 12(b)(6).81  Thus, the Ninth Circuit found that the district 
court engaged in an improper scope of review of the plaintiffs’ claims. 82 
The Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred in dismissing the 
plaintiffs’ claims for lack of constitutional standing under Rule 12(b)(6) 
because Twombly and Iqbal—the cases defining statutory standing 
requirements—are not applicable within the context of constitutional 
standing.83  The elements of constitutional standing—injury-in-fact, 
causation, and redressability—turn on the “nature and source” of a 
plaintiff’s asserted claim.84  That is, the substance of constitutional 
standing is to measure whether a plaintiff’s pleadings show a sufficient 
personal stake in the outcome of his or her claim so as to call upon the 
federal courts’ jurisdiction for redressability.85 
The context of constitutional standing is a question of subject matter 
jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), which is distinct from the analysis of 
the merits of a plaintiff’s claims under Twombly and Iqbal.86  
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held that analysis of a plaintiff’s merits is 
 78 Id. at 1067-68. 
 79 Id. at 1073; see FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 80 Jasmine Networks, Inc. v. Superior Court, 180 Cal. App. 4th 980, 990 (6th Dist. 2009) 
(citation omitted); Maya, 658 F.3d at 1067; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see FED. R. CIV. P. 
12(b)(1). 
 81 Maya, 658 F.3d at 1067. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. at 1067-68 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544 (2007)). 
 84 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975). 
 85 Id. at 498-99 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).  
 86 Maya, 658 F.3d at 1068; see FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). 
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not necessary, nor is it proper for purposes of constitutional standing,87 
because Twombly and Iqbal deal with a “fundamentally different 
issue.”88  Thus, the district court improperly assessed the merits of the 
plaintiffs’ claims, deviating from the proper review for lack of 
constitutional standing. 
D. OVERPAYMENT AND RESCISSION 
The district court held that plaintiffs’ overpayment and rescission 
claims were “too speculative to constitute an injury-in-fact” because 
plaintiffs allegedly may have earned a profit if they had sold their homes 
later when their property values rise.89  Further, the district court held 
that plaintiffs did not establish sufficient causation between defendants’ 
actions and plaintiffs’ payment of artificially inflated prices.90  The 
district court reasoned that the rise in housing prices was a “nationwide 
phenomenon” that was attributable to other independent variables and, 
thus, was independent of defendants’ challenged actions.91 
The Ninth Circuit, however, recognized plaintiffs’ overpayment and 
rescission claims as actual and concrete economic injuries for 
constitutional standing purposes.92  Due to defendants’ concealment of 
critical information about the housing development and the defendants’ 
marketing scheme, plaintiffs claimed that they were economically 
injured when they “paid more for their homes than the homes were worth 
at the time of the sale.”93  The Ninth Circuit reasoned that selling their 
homes for a potential profit in the future would not redress plaintiffs’ 
economic injury because plaintiffs overpaid for the property at the time 
of sale.94  Moreover, plaintiffs argued that they would not have 
purchased their homes had defendants disclosed their high-risk 
marketing and financing behavior.95  Thus, the Ninth Circuit agreed that 
plaintiffs’ economic injury was a sufficient injury-in-fact for 
constitutional standing purposes.96 
 87 Id. (citing Equity Lifestyle Props., Inc. v. San Luis Obispo, 548 F.3d 1184, 1189 & n.10 
(9th Cir. 2008)). 
 88 Id. 
 89 Maya v. Centex Corp., No. EDCV 09-01671 VAP (OPx), 2010 WL 6843322, at *8 (C.D. 
Cal. Mar. 31, 2010), rev’d, 658 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2011); Maya, 658 F.3d at 1069. 
 90 Maya, 658 F.3d at 1070. 
 91 Id. (citing Maya, 2010 WL 6843322, at *11). 
 92 Id. at 1069 (stating that the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have recognized clear and 
obvious economic injuries as a sufficient basis for standing). 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. (“This is a quintessential injury-in-fact.”). 
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Plaintiffs argued that defendants’ nondisclosure and intentional 
concealment of defendants’ challenged conduct caused plaintiffs to 
suffer their alleged economic injuries.97  Plaintiffs alleged that 
defendants misrepresented their intention to offer “homes only to people 
who will occupy them,” and rather “sold homes to investors who had no 
intent to reside in the homes and who were more likely to” abandon their 
properties when economic adversity arose.98  Defendants advertised 
properties to “unqualified buyers” 99 who were financially unable to 
qualify for traditional prime loans,100 making them likely recipients of 
sub-prime loans.101  Additionally, plaintiffs argued that these 
“unqualified buyers” were more likely to face foreclosure.102  Moreover, 
defendants allegedly “financed at least [sixty-five percent] of the 
mortgages on homes in [plaintiffs’ particular] communities.”103 
The Ninth Circuit interpreted the facts favorably to the plaintiffs, 
and found that plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged that defendants caused 
their economic injury of overpayment for constitutional standing 
purposes, giving plaintiffs the right to pursue these claims against 
defendants.104  The court reasoned that defendants were able to 
manipulate many of the loans’ terms to artificially generate demand that 
would not have occurred but for defendants’ extended financing to the 
majority of buyers, including unqualified buyers, in the plaintiffs’ 
particular neighborhoods.105  Additionally, since plaintiffs’ communities 
were new developments, the Ninth Circuit had no other independent 
economic data to compare the neighborhoods’ value against.106  Under 
the circumstances, the Maya court held that plaintiffs can plausibly claim 
that the defendants’ marketing and financial practices created the 
“artificial demand” that can be attributed to plaintiffs’ heightened 
purchase price for their homes.107 
 97 Id. at 1065. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. & n.2 (“Plaintiffs do not explicitly define what they mean by ‘unqualified’ buyers, but 
it appears their definition encompasses those with unverified income, poor credit history, or inability 
to make a down payment of less [sic] than 20% of the home’s value.”). 
 100 Bar-Gill, supra note 7, at 1096 & n.72 (2009) (stating that the traditional, prime loan is a 
relatively simple thirty-year fixed-rate mortgage “for 80 percent, or less, of the home price,” 
requiring an initial down payment of at least 20%). 
 101 Id. at 1097 & n.75 (“In 2005 and 2006, the median subprime home buyer put no money 
down, borrowing 100 percent of the purchase price of the house.”). 
 102 Maya, 658 F.3d at 1065. 
 103 Id. at 1065. 
 104 Id. at 1070. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. 
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The Ninth Circuit found causation between defendants’ actions and 
plaintiffs’ rescission claim to be strengthened by defendants’ alleged 
nondisclosure of material information that was closely related to 
plaintiffs’ economic injury.108  Plaintiffs claimed that they would not 
have purchased their homes if defendants had properly disclosed their 
alleged high-risk marketing and financing behavior.109  Thus, the Ninth 
Circuit held that plaintiffs had alleged both injury and causation 
sufficiently for overpayment and rescission claims for purposes of 
constitutional standing.110  On remand, the district court will determine 
whether defendants are actually liable for plaintiffs’ overpayment and 
rescission claims.111 
E. DECREASED VALUE AND DESIRABILITY 
In Maya, the Ninth Circuit held that the reduced economic value of 
plaintiffs’ homes is a cognizable injury for constitutional standing.112  
The Ninth Circuit cited a number of cases to support its holding on this 
issue.113  For instance, in Barnum Timber Co. v. United States 
Environmental Protection Agency, the Ninth Circuit held that a 
landowner’s allegation that his property would lose economic value due 
to the “EPA’s impending classification of a neighboring creek as an 
impaired water body had established an injury in fact sufficient to 
withstand a motion to dismiss.”114  Even considering the decline of the 
national housing market, the court noted that plaintiffs’ main argument 
was that “defendants’ acts caused their homes to lose value above and 
beyond those losses caused by general economic conditions.”115 
Further, the Ninth Circuit held that a claim for decreased 
desirability is an injury-in-fact sufficient for constitutional standing 
purposes because “the blight resulting from defendants’ lending practices 
[made] their homes less desirable places to live.”116  The Ninth Circuit 
also cited a number of cases for support of its holding on this issue.117  
For instance, in City of Sausalito v. O’Neil, the Ninth Circuit held that “a 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id.  
 112 Id. at 1070-71 (“A current reduction in the economic value of one’s home is a cognizable 
injury for constitutional standing purposes.”). 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. (citing Barnum Timber v. EPA, 633 F.3d 894, 898 (9th Cir. 2011)). 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. at 1071-72. 
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city had constitutional standing to pursue its claim” of decreased 
desirability because “defendants’ act would result in increased traffic, 
crowds, decreased attractiveness, and damage to the town’s historical 
character.”118 
The Ninth Circuit, however, agreed with the district court’s ruling 
that plaintiffs did not establish sufficient causation to link defendants’ 
alleged actions to plaintiffs’ decreased property value and desirability 
claims.119  The district court held that plaintiffs lacked sufficient 
causation for these claims because any alleged loss of property value or 
desirability can be traced not only to defendants’ actions, “but also [to] 
the independent actions of others” not involved in the lawsuit.120  The 
district court noted specific examples, including “homeowners [and 
unqualified buyers] in Plaintiffs’ neighborhoods who defaulted on their 
mortgages and third-party mortgage companies that foreclosed on houses 
in Plaintiffs’ neighborhoods.”121  In short, plaintiffs did not show how 
defendants’ actions caused the inordinate number of foreclosures in 
plaintiffs’ particular communities because it was other, independent third 
parties who initiated those foreclosure proceedings—not defendants 
themselves.122  Thus, the district court found plaintiffs’ claims to be 
“necessarily [dependent] upon a causal chain that includes numerous 
independent forces and individual decisions of” other independent, third 
parties not involved in the lawsuit.123 
Despite the lack of causation, the Ninth Circuit permitted the 
plaintiffs to amend their complaints.124  The Ninth Circuit noted that it 
was possible that plaintiffs’ complaints could be saved by amendment 
because expert testimony could be used to establish the causal effect 
between defendants’ actions and plaintiffs’ injuries.125  Furthermore, 
expert testimony may be used to distinguish the causal effect between 
defendants’ actions and plaintiffs’ injuries from other independent 
variables, such as third parties and the general economy.126  Since 
“[b]efore the district court, plaintiffs offered to amend and produce an 
 118 Id. (citing City of Sausalito v. O’Neil, 386 F.3d 1186, 1198-99 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
 119 Id. at 1072 (“We agree with the district court that plaintiffs have not established how 
defendants’ actions necessarily result in foreclosure, nor do plaintiffs’ complaints allege that the 
decreased value is caused by the risk posed by their neighbors (even absent foreclosures).”). 
 120 Maya v. Centex Corp., No. EDCV 09-01671 VAP (OPx), 2010 WL 6843322, at *9 (C.D. 
Cal. Mar. 31, 2010), rev’d, 658 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 121 Id. 
 122 Maya, 658 F.3d at 1072; Maya, 2010 WL 6843322, at *9. 
 123 Maya, 2010 WL 6843322, at *9 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-
61 (1992)). 
 124 Maya, 658 F.3d at 1073. 
 125 Id. at 1072-73 (citing Barnum Timber Co. v. EPA, 633 F.3d 894, 900-01 (9th Cir. 2011)). 
 126 Id. 
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expert report distinguishing the effects of defendants’ actions from 
general economic influences,” the Ninth Circuit permitted plaintiffs to 
amend their complaints on remand.127 
F. MAYA’S IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REAL ESTATE FIELD AND 
HOUSING MARKET 
Although Maya’s ruling may help numerous similarly situated 
homeowners seeking redress against developers for speculative injuries 
that may not be fairly traceable to the developers, Maya could be 
extended to other contexts in which a plaintiff alleges an injury that may 
not yet have occurred “through a formal economic transaction.”128  With 
a chance to pursue their claims against defendants and establish 
causation for decreased value and desirability claims through expert 
testimony, the plaintiffs’ class action suit may reach the trial stage, where 
a sympathetic jury could find the developers liable.129  Housing 
developers throughout California and the rest of the country will be 
“nervously” following the case’s progress on remand.130 
CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Maya could allow numerous 
homeowners to assert claims against real estate developers for injuries 
that resulted from third-party foreclosures.  As the case illustrates, for 
purposes of constitutional standing, the decreased value and desirability 
of a homeowner’s property may constitute as an injury-in-fact to invoke 
the federal jurisdiction for redressability, provided that the homeowner 
can link his alleged injury causally to a defendant’s action.  By clarifying 
the proper standard of review for questions of subject matter jurisdiction 
and constitutional standing, the Ninth Circuit may have extended liability 
 127 Id. 
 128 Maya v. Centex: Lawsuit Alleging High-Risk Loans Diminished Neighborhood Property 
Values May Proceed, IMPACT LITIG. J. (Oct. 26, 2011), www.impactlitigation.com/2011/10/26/ 
maya-v-centex-lawsuit-alleging-high-risk-loans-diminished-neighborhood-property-values-may-
proceed. 
 129 Roger Bernhardt, Maya v. Centex Corp., Golden Gate Sch. of Law Faculty Scholarship, 
Paper No. 475 (2011), available at digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/cgi/viewcontent. 
cgi?article=1473&context=pubs (“This opinion could act as a warning shot across the bow for many 
major players in the real estate industry.  The plaintiffs should not have too much trouble 
corroborating their factual allegations or obtaining expert testimony to endorse their theories.  If they 
can get the matter to a sympathetic jury, who knows what could happen?”). 
 130 Steven G. Lee, Developers May Be Liable to Homeowners for Marketing to Sub-prime 
Buyers, CAL. LITIG. ATTORNEY BLOG (Oct. 19, 2011), www.rhlaw.com/blog/developers-may-be-
liable-to-homeowners-for-marketing-to-sub-prime-buyers. 
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for developers who promise prospective homeowners stable housing 
developments for speculative injuries that may not be directly traceable 
to the developers’ conduct.  Maya’s implications may extend nationwide 
because the plaintiffs’ putative class includes homeowners living in new 
housing developments in dozens of states.131 
 
 131 John Roemer, Homeowners Get a Boost in Class Action Against Builders, DAILY J., (Sept. 
22, 2011) (defendants “include eight of the nation’s largest home developers and their mortgage 
subsidiaries, including Lennar Corp., Centex Homes, D.R. Horton Inc., Richmond American Homes 
of California Inc., Beazer Homes USA Inc., Shea Homes Inc., Ryland Homes of California Inc., and 
Standard Pacific Corp.”). 
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